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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1923, the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine was awarded to Frederick 
Banting and James Macleod “for the discovery of insulin.”1 In his Nobel lecture 
in 1925, Banting delivered a technical description of the discovery and its appli-
cations, concluding with the observation that insulin would not cure diabetes, 
but would provide diabetics with the ability to cope with “the economic burdens 
of life.”2 Having sold his patent on the discovery to the University of Toronto 
for only a dollar in the interest of public health,3 Banting could not have fath-
omed how ironic his concluding remark would become. 
The economic burdens of life with diabetes have ballooned, with patients in 
the United States experiencing a 700% increase in the price of insulin in the past 
two decades.4 For those who rely on insulin, the individual health consequences 
of skyrocketing prices can be disastrous. Insufficient insulin can lead to critical 
health problems, including renal failure, amputation, heart disease, blindness, and 
even death.5 
Currently, ninety percent of the world’s supply of insulin, and one hundred 
percent of the U.S.’s supply, come from just three drug manufacturers: Eli Lilly, 
Novo Nordisk, and Sanofi.6 Although these manufacturers have attempted to 
reduce their prices in response to recent public and congressional outrage,7 more 
could still be done. Policy changes to the intellectual property protections sur-
rounding biologic drugs would help to ensure continued access to insulin for the 
millions of Americans who rely on the drug. 
The intellectual property protections available to manufacturers of pharma-
ceuticals in the United States include patent, regulatory exclusivity, and trade 
 
 1 THE NOBEL PRIZE IN PHYSIOLOGY OR MEDICINE 1923, NOBEL PRIZE https://www.no-
belprize.org/prizes/medicine/1923/summary/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2019). 
 2 Frederick G. Banting Nobel Lecture, Diabetes and Insulin (Sept. 15, 1925), in NOBEL 
LECTURES, PHYSIOLOGY OR MEDICINE 1922-1941 (Elsevier Publishing Co. 1965), 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/1923/banting/lecture/. 
 3 Jeremy A. Greene & Kevin R. Riggs, Why Is There No Generic Insulin? Historical Origins of a 
Modern Problem, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1171, 1171 (2015). 
 4 Drew Pendergrass, How Insulin Became Unaffordable, HARV. POL. REV. (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/how-insulin-became-unaffordable/ (noting that 
price increase accounts for inflation). 
 5 Id.; Tiffany Stanley, Life, Death, and Insulin, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/01/07/feature/insulin-is-a-
lifesaving-drug-but-it-has-become-intolerably-expensive-and-the-consequences-can-be-
tragic/. 
 6 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE 
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 2 (2018). 
 7 Stine Jacobsen, Novo Nordisk to cut insulin prices in the U.S., THOMSON REUTERS (Sept. 6, 
2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-novo-nordisk-usa/novo-nordisk-to-cut-insulin-
prices-in-the-us-idUSKCN1VR1JO. 
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secrecy.8 Makers of insulin rely heavily on trade secrecy, a protection that can 
theoretically last forever, to prevent their manufacturing processes from falling 
into competitors’ hands.9 The complexity and difficulty of manufacturing insulin 
and similar drugs10 means that trade secret protections around manufacturing 
processes effectively stymie new entrants to the insulin market.11 The relative 
lack of competition keeps prices high to the detriment of those who rely on in-
sulin to survive.12 A reduction in trade secret protections for the processes these 
three companies use to manufacture insulin would facilitate the entry of new 
competitors into the insulin market, thus reducing prices. 
This Note serves to: (1) provide background on insulin and its uses for treat-
ing diabetes; (2) describe the current intellectual property environment around 
pharmaceuticals; (3) lay foundation for the current regulatory framework gov-
erning insulin specifically; (4) describe how the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 and 
the Biosimilars Act of 2010 create the opportunity for less expensive follow-on 
forms of insulin; and (5) argue that relaxing the trade secret protections around 
the insulin manufacturing process is likely to be successful in increasing compe-
tition and lowering prices in the insulin market. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The following sections provide background information on insulin and its 
clinical application for managing diabetes. To facilitate the reader’s understand-
ing of the particular policy challenges insulin pricing poses, this section goes into 
detail about how the prevalence of diabetes raises the level of urgency surround-
ing this issue. This section also discusses how insulin differs from chemical med-
ications and the problems that arise as a result of the differences between the 
two. 
A. DIABETES 
The primary application of commercial insulin is to manage diabetes mellitus, 
a chronic condition commonly referred to simply as diabetes.13 Diabetes is 
caused by the body’s inability to properly regulate the level of glucose, a type of 
 
 8 KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 3 (2019); W. 
Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Price Competition and Innovation, 
101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1046 (2016). 
 9 Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1046. 
 10 Id. at 1048-49. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Greene & Riggs, supra note 3, at 1171. 
 13 MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/diabetes/symptoms-
causes/syc-20371444 (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
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sugar, in the blood.14 Cells throughout the body require glucose for energy, and 
the pancreas produces insulin to prevent glucose levels from rising too high.15 
There are two types of diabetes.16 Though the exact cause is unknown, type 
one diabetes results when the body’s immune system destroys the cells in the 
pancreas that produce insulin.17 Type two diabetes, which is far more common 
in the U.S.,18 is thought to be influenced by lifestyle factors such as diet and 
exercise.19 Cells in the body of a patient with type two diabetes become resistant 
to insulin such that the body cannot produce enough to regulate blood glucose 
levels effectively.20 
Diabetes, particularly type two, is extremely common in the U.S.21 According 
to estimates by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), over 
thirty million Americans, or slightly less than one in every ten, suffer from dia-
betes.22 Worse still, the CDC estimates that nearly seven million of those thirty 
million people have not been formally diagnosed.23 The issue with diabetes, how-
ever, is not just in the number of people affected with the disease. Diabetes also 
affects some regions and ethnicities more than others. The highest concentra-
tions of people with diabetes are in the southeastern U.S.,24 and the condition 
disproportionately affects African-Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Native 
Americans.25 
Diabetes takes an enormous toll on public health in the United States, both 
in terms of loss of life and productivity, and in terms of the financial burden it 
places on both those with the disease and the healthcare industry more gener-
ally.26 In 2013, the CDC estimates that diabetes caused roughly 75,000 deaths 
among people aged fifteen and older, and that diabetes-linked conditions such 
as renal failure and heart disease caused an additional 293,000 deaths in the same 
 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2019). 
 19 Id. 
 20 MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/diabetes/symptoms-
causes/syc-20371444 (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 21 AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2019). 
 22 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: NATIONAL DIABETES STATISTICS 
REPORT, 2020 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-
statistics-report.pdf. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 5. 
 25 Id. at 4. 
 26 See generally CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: DIABETES STATE 
BURDEN TOOLKIT, https://nccd.cdc.gov/Toolkit/DiabetesBurden (last visited Mar. 2, 2020). 
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age group.27 The CDC further estimates that in 2013, diabetes and diabetes-
linked conditions cost the United States over $300 billion in healthcare costs.28 
Without an adequate supply of insulin, a diabetic patient can quickly experi-
ence severe medical issues, including renal failure, amputation, heart disease, 
blindness, and even death.29 The urgency surrounding the issue of access to in-
sulin reflects the often devastating health effects individuals with diabetes suffer 
when they do not get the required dose. A Yale Diabetes Center survey con-
ducted in 2017 found that one quarter of respondents reported undercompliance 
with their prescribed dose of insulin because of the cost.30 Of those patients 
reporting cost-related underuse, one third reported that they had not discussed 
the cost issue with their doctor,31 which suggests that the problem of underuse 
of insulin by diabetics is perhaps even worse than we realize. The fundraising 
website Go Fund Me lists hundreds of fundraisers for individual diabetics in 
need of help paying for insulin, with fundraising goals ranging from a few hun-
dred dollars to several thousand.32 
The following section discusses insulin in greater depth and explains how its 
discovery and evolution over the past century have contributed to the current 
pricing crisis. 
B. INSULIN 
1. How Insulin Works in the Body 
As mentioned previously, insulin is a hormone that occurs naturally in the 
body.33 As such, pharmaceutical insulin is what is known as a biologic drug, or 
simply a biologic. Biologics are substances derived from a living organism and 
are distinct from chemical medications that are manufactured purely through 
chemical synthesis.34 Biologics have a broad array of clinical applications, 
 
 27 Id. (2013 is the most recent year for which such data are available.) 
 28 Id. 
 29 Stanley, supra note 5. 
 30 Darby Herkert et al., Cost-Related Insulin Underuse Among Patients With Diabetes, 179:1 JAMA 
INTERNAL MEDICINE 112, 112-13 (2019). 
 31 Id. at 113. 
 32 GO FUND ME, https://www.gofundme.com/mvc.php?route=homepage_norma/ 
search&term=insulin (last visited Nov. 5, 2019). Appeals for help paying for insulin have be-
come so commonplace that Go Fund Me published an article specifically advising individuals 
of alternative sources of insulin and how best to use Go Fund Me to raise money to pay for 
it. GO FUND ME: HOW TO GET INSULIN WHEN YOU CAN’T AFFORD IT: 6 IDEAS, 
https://www.gofundme.com/c/blog/how-to-get-insulin (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). 
 33 MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/diabetes/symptoms-
causes/syc-20371444 (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
 34 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: CENTER FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND 
RESEARCH (CBER), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-biologics-evaluation-and-re-
search-cber/what-are-biologics-questions-and-answers (last visited Jan. 12, 2020). 
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including treatment of cancer, rheumatoid arthritis, and infertility.35 Some exam-
ples of biologics include vaccines, gene therapy products, and recombinant ther-
apeutic proteins such as insulin.36 The distinction between biologics and chemi-
cal medications is important because there are major differences between these 
two classes of products in terms of their structure and manufacture and how they 
fit into the regulatory framework for pharmaceuticals. This regulatory framework 
will be discussed in detail in later sections. 
In general, the molecules of which biologics are comprised are much larger 
and more complex than the molecules that make up chemical medications.37 One 
commentator provides the following example to illustrate the difference between 
chemical drugs and biologic drugs: “In terms of size and rough complexity, if an 
aspirin were a bicycle, a small biologic would be a Toyota Prius, and a large bio-
logic would be an F-16 fighter jet.”38 Insulin is a small biologic made up of a 
chain of fifty-one amino acids, and the specific way in which the amino acid chain 
folds and twists determines the chemical identity of the substance.39 
The pancreas, part of the endocrine system in human beings and some other 
mammals, produces insulin to regulate the level of glucose in the blood.40 With 
a few exceptions, insulin must be injected into the layer of fat beneath the skin 
in order for the body to metabolize it.41 If swallowed, digestive acids would break 
the protein in the hormone down so as to render it ineffective for purposes of 
managing blood glucose.42 
 
2. Development of the Manufacturing Process for Pharmaceutical Insulin 
Frederick Banting, a physician in Toronto, Canada, discovered insulin in 1921 
with the help of graduate student Charles Best.43 From the beginning, insulin was 
seen as something of a ‘miracle drug,’ transforming diabetes from a lethal disease 
into a manageable chronic condition.44 Motivated by the public health 
 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1026. 
 38 Id. (citation omitted). 
 39 David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific, and Legal Issues Relevant to Designing 
Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant Protein-Based Therapeutics and Monoclonal An-
tibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 143, 188 (2005). 
 40 AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes/medication-
management/insulin-other-injectables/insulin-basics (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Greene & Riggs, supra note 3, at 1171. The splitting of the 1923 Nobel Prize for the 
discovery between Banting and James Macleod, the head of the physiology lab at the Univer-
sity of Toronto where Banting and Best made their discovery, rather than between Banting 
and Best is a fascinating story of academic politics that is beyond the scope of this note. See 
generally, Louis Rosenfeld, Insulin: Discovery and Controversy, 48(12) CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 2270 
(2002). 
 44 Greene & Riggs, supra note 3, at 1171. 
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implications of their discovery rather than the potential for monetizing it, Bant-
ing and Best sold the patent for insulin to the University of Toronto for a mere 
one dollar.45 
In its nearly 100-year history, pharmaceutical insulin, or commercial insulin 
as it is sometimes called, has undergone numerous changes.46 In the early days 
after the discovery, insulin makers manufactured the substance using extracts 
from the whole pancreas of a cow or pig.47 This method posed two serious prob-
lems. First, this process made it difficult to manufacture at the scale needed to 
meet demand.48 Second, the animal extracts used also caused severe side effects 
in some patients.49 
Today, insulin production no longer relies on livestock, but rather on micro-
organisms.50 In the early 1980’s, insulin makers began using recombinant DNA 
technology to manipulate the DNA of microbes such as E. coli, essentially re-
programming the microbe at the DNA level.51 These genetically altered microbes 
produce insulin that is chemically identical to the insulin the human pancreas 
produces naturally.52 Recombinant insulin does not cause the same side effects 
that animal extract varieties once did.53 It also achieves a much higher standard 
of purity and effectiveness,54 with several different subtypes available depending 
on the patient’s specific needs.55 The first recombinant human insulin to receive 
FDA approval was Eli Lilly’s Humulin in 1982.56 
Insulin makers have since made small modifications to recombinant human 
insulin’s molecular structure to create what are known as insulin analogs.57 There 
are five different types of insulin analog available today: “long-acting, rapid-act-
ing, intermediate-acting, short-acting (regular insulin), and premixed.”58 These 
various types allow diabetic patients to control the window of effectiveness of 
the insulin to counteract the blood glucose spike that occurs during and shortly 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1172. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2019). 
 56 See Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 165. 
 57 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE 
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 1 (2018). 
 58 Id. 
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after meals.59 The vast majority of diabetic patients in the U.S. use some form of 
insulin analog to manage the condition.60 
In the U.S., the price of insulin rose by 700% over the past twenty years.61 
Price spikes vary depending on the specific type of the drug.62 For example, be-
tween 2001 and 2015, “the price of one type of insulin (insulin lispro) increased 
585% (from $35 to $234 per vial).”63 Depending on the patient’s needs, a vial of 
insulin may last only about two weeks,64 resulting in an out-of-pocket cost of 
roughly $500 per month for an uninsured person. In short, diabetes presents a 
tremendous public health challenge in the U.S. and the lack of affordable insulin 
seriously exacerbates the issue. A primary contributor to the insulin pricing issue 
is the intellectual property protections available to manufacturers of pharmaceu-
ticals, which the next section explores in detail. 
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
The purpose of intellectual property law is to codify an innovator’s property 
rights in her innovation.65 Pharmaceutical products and other forms of medical 
intervention are perhaps one of the best examples of the need to balance the 
rights of the innovator with the social utility of the innovation.66 Modern phar-
maceutical technology is one example of an ethical quandary that has played out 
in capitalist societies throughout history: how does a government protect the 
average, non-wealthy person from being priced out of a product necessary for 
survival without punishing or unduly disincentivizing the maker of that prod-
uct?67 
Some governments respond to this dilemma by recognizing the innovator’s 
property rights in the innovation itself through intellectual property law.68 In the 
U.S., pharmaceutical companies benefit from several different types of 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. (“In 2000, of privately insured adults with type 2 diabetes using insulin, 19% were 
using analog insulins; by 2010, 96% were using these products.”) 
 61 Pendergrass, supra note 4. 
 62 See JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE 
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 1 (2018). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 KEVIN J. HICKEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10986, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A 
BRIEF INTRODUCTION 1 (2018). 
 66 Alexandra E. Blasi, An Ethical Dilemma: Patents & Profits v. Access & Affordability, 33 J. 
LEGAL MED. 115, 115 (2012). 
 67 Id. 
 68 KEVIN J. HICKEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10986, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A 
BRIEF INTRODUCTION 1 (2018). 
9
Hanson: The Economic Burdens of Life: Trade Secrecy and the Insulin Prici
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law,
260 J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 27:2 
protection for intellectual property. The following sections discuss three such 
protections: (1) patent, (2) regulatory exclusivity, and (3) trade secret. 
A. PATENT 
Patents provide the innovator with a period of time during which competitors 
are excluded from manufacturing the product, an arrangement that is essentially 
a temporary, lawful monopoly.69 Pharmaceutical innovators may apply for patent 
protection for the active ingredient in a product, the delivery method, a manu-
facturing method, a device or other technology needed to administer the drug, 
or other innovations.70 The term of patent protection lasts twenty years,71 and 
legislation specific to pharmaceuticals provides for up to an additional five years 
to account for delays in FDA approval.72 
In exchange for the period of exclusivity, the patent holder must disclose the 
details of the innovation for use by others in the future.73 The Patent Act of 1952 
requires that the patent holder disclose: 
[A] written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and 
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by 
the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.74 
Thus, the incentive to innovate is preserved while providing the public an op-
portunity to benefit later from more competition and lower prices.75 
The patent system is not without its drawbacks. One issue in the pharmaceu-
tical context is under-disclosure.76 The benefits of the patent system to society at 
large rely on full disclosure of the details of the innovation in the patent applica-
tion so that competitors can replicate the innovation once the patent expires, 
thereby lowering the price.77 However, the majority of patents do not describe 
 
 69 See KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 6 (2019). 
 70 Id. at 13. 
 71 Id. at 10. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 
401, 407 (2010). 
 74 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)(2018). 
 75 See Devlin, supra note 73, at 407. 
 76 Id. at 411. 
 77 Id. at 409. 
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the invention in enough detail for competitors to replicate it once the patent 
expires.78 
B. REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITY 
Another form of intellectual property protection available to pharmaceutical 
innovators is regulatory exclusivity, which prevents the FDA from approving a 
follow-on product for a specified period of time.79 There are two types of regu-
latory exclusivity: 
(1) data exclusivity, which precludes applicants from relying on 
FDA’s safety and effectiveness findings for the reference prod-
uct … to demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of the follow-
on product; and (2) marketing exclusivity, which precludes FDA 
from approving any other application for the same pharmaceu-
tical product and use, regardless of whether the applicant has 
generated its own safety and effectiveness data.80 
 The Biosimilars Act, discussed in detail in subsequent sections, provides mar-
keting exclusivity for name-brand biologics by barring applications for FDA ap-
proval of follow-on products for four years after the name-brand product is li-
censed.81 For eight years after that, the FDA will accept applications for approval 
of follow-on products, but will not approve any of them for licensing.82 Regula-
tory exclusivity bears some similarity to patent in that it arises in federal statute 
and provides a fixed term of protection that must eventually lapse.83 
C. TRADE SECRET 
Trade secrecy protects information that: (1) confers economic benefit upon 
the holder because (2) it is not generally known and (3) the secrecy of which the 
holder takes reasonable steps to preserve.84 As a general matter, an innovator 
must choose between patent protection and trade secrecy protection.85 Trade 
secret is an attractive choice because it covers innovations that are, for whatever 
 
 78 Id. at 411. 
 79 KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 23 (2019). 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 24-25. 
 82 Id. at 25. 
 83 See Id. at 23-24. 
 84 Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. R. 1, 6-7 
(2007). 
 85 Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1042. 
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reason, not eligible for patent, and because it is much cheaper to maintain than 
patent protection.86 
Trade secrecy is an outlier in the law of intellectual property in that the ap-
proach it takes to the balancing of interests is very different from that of patent. 
Rather than balancing the interests of the society at large with those of the inno-
vator, trade secrecy has been criticized for most often benefitting the holder of 
the secret while discouraging competition by hindering the sharing of infor-
mation.87 Another criticism is that trade secret provides cover for companies 
who engage in business practices that put the public at risk.88 
Furthermore, in contrast to a patent’s fixed period of exclusivity, there is no 
prescribed term of trade secret protection. The holder has a cause of action for 
misappropriation of the information for as long as the holder benefits econom-
ically and takes reasonable steps to preserve the secrecy.89 Pharmaceutical com-
panies, and makers of biologics in particular, patent the products themselves and 
rely heavily on trade secrecy to protect their manufacturing processes and tech-
niques.90 
In the following sections, this Note explores how the intellectual property 
environment surrounding pharmaceuticals perpetuates the insulin pricing crisis 
discussed above,91 and how policymaking could potentially alleviate what has be-
come a serious public health problem in the U.S. 
IV. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR INSULIN AND BEYOND 
As discussed previously, insulin has been commercially available as a phar-
maceutical product for nearly a century.92 In that time, the pharmaceutical indus-
try has undergone massive growth, becoming one of the largest and most prof-
itable industries in the country.93 This industry growth, as well as tremendous 
technological advances in pharmaceuticals and increased focus on public safety, 
have resulted in a complex statutory framework relevant to all pharmaceuticals, 
and to insulin specifically. The following sections discuss how, in spite of 
 
 86 Julie E. Zink, When Trade Secrecy Goes Too Far: Public Health and Safety Should Trump Corporate 
Profits, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1135, 1138 (2018). 
 87 See Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1044. The tangentially related issue of under-disclosure 
discussed in Section III(A), infra, would seem to leave no viable alternative. However, the more 
that is known about a product, the easier the disclosure requirement is to enforce. Patent 
requires disclosure even if it does not always get it in full, whereas the entire purpose of trade 
secret is to withhold information. See Id. at 1044-45. 
 88 See generally, Zink, supra note 86 (identifying examples of chemical companies using trade 
secret protection to hide the health hazards of their products). 
 89 Id. at 1138. 
 90 Id. at 1046. 
 91 Supra section II. 
 92 Supra section II(B). 
 93 Catherine D. Deangelis, Big Pharma Profits and the Public Loses, 94(1) MILBANK QUARTERLY 
30, 30 (2016). 
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legislative efforts to increase competition and lower prices for pharmaceuticals, 
insulin prices remain burdensome, if not prohibitive, for many patients. 
A. BIOLOGICS UNDER THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (1938) 
AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT (1944) 
Insulin and a handful of other biologics occupy a somewhat confusing space 
in federal law that originates in a century-old bifurcation in the way drugs are 
regulated in the U.S.94 This section provides an overview of this history to clarify 
the current regulatory environment for insulin. 
The FDA has authority to review and approve all prescription drugs before 
they can enter the market.95 However, this authority arises out of two different 
pieces of legislation with differing requirements.96 The first is the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FFDCA).97 The FFDCA defines “drug” in 
relevant part as “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals.”98 Pharmaceutical prod-
ucts within the scope of FFDCA include insulin and a small number of other 
biologics, and all chemical medications.99 
The second is the Public Health Service Act of 1944 (PHSA).100 The PHSA 
is a recodification of the Biologics Act of 1902, “the first enduring scheme of 
national regulation for any pharmaceutical product.”101 Because the Biologics 
Act focused mostly on vaccines, its recodification in the PHSA is restricted to 
biologics,102 and the pharmaceutical products in scope of the PHSA include the 
majority of biologic drugs (i.e., all biologics other than the few in scope of the 
FFDCA).103 The version of the PHSA in effect today defines “biological prod-
uct” as: 
 
 94 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS: 
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 3 (2019). 
 95 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11075, FDA AND DRUG PRICES: 
FACILITATING ACCESS TO GENERIC DRUGS 1 (2019). 
 96 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS: 
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 5 (2019). 
 97 21 U.S.C. ch. 9 (2018). 
 98 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2018). 
 99 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS: 
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 3-4 (2019). 
 100 42 U.S.C. ch. 6A (2018). 
 101 Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 147. The Biologics Act was enacted in response to multiple 
incidents of vaccine contamination that resulted in numerous deaths. The Act only provided 
for regulation of manufacturing conditions, labeling, and interstate traffic of drugs, and not 
the safety or efficacy of the products themselves. Id. at 148. 
 102 Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 152. 
 103 See AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND 
BIOSIMILARS: BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 3-4 (2019). 
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a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood 
component or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any 
chemically synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product, or 
arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other triva-
lent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the prevention, 
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.104 
Until 1941, pursuant to its agreement with Banting and Best, the researchers 
who discovered insulin,105 the University of Toronto monitored and tested each 
batch of insulin for quality prior to sending it to market.106 In 1941, just days 
before the University’s patent on insulin expired, Congress amended the FFDCA 
to empower the FDA to regulate insulin out of fear that safety standards would 
decrease once the University lost the right to examine each batch.107 Insulin and 
a handful of other small biologics remained within the purview of the FFDCA, 
even though the vast majority of modern biologics fall within the scope of the 
PSHA.108 The next section will focus on legislative efforts to remedy some of 
these existing problems by creating a “follow-on” pharmaceutical market.   
B. CREATION OF THE FOLLOW-ON PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET 
Congress’ attempt to increase competition in this area while still preserving 
intellectual property protections, often referred to as the “follow-on” pharma-
ceutical market, is the next piece of the insulin pricing puzzle. In most instances, 
the U.S. differs from most other industrialized nations in that it takes a generally 
free-market approach to prescription drug pricing.109 This is to say that pharma-
ceutical companies are free to charge whatever the market will bear for their 
products, and the government has no power to intervene.110 This system stands 
in contrast to those operative in Canada and the European Union, where single-
payer healthcare systems give the government more power to keep prices man-
ageable.111 The U.S. government is not empowered to negotiate prices with 
 
 104 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2018). 
 105 Supra section II(B). 
 106 Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 153. 
 107 Id. 
 108 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS: 
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 8-9 (2019). 
 109 Marie Salter, Reference Pricing: An Effective Model for the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry?, 35 NW. 
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 413, 415 (2015). 
 110 Hannah Brennan, et. al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent 
Use for Health, 18 Yale J. L. & Tech. 275, 284 (2016). 
 111 Jessica R. Underwood, What the E.U. has that the U.S. Wants: An Analysis of Potential Regu-
latory Systems for Follow-On Biologics in the United States, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 419, 423 
(2007). 
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pharmaceutical companies, even for those drugs covered under government 
healthcare programs such as Medicare.112 
The trade-off inherent in this unusual paradigm is punishingly high costs for 
prescriptions coupled with an extraordinary degree of pharmaceutical innova-
tion.113  Two federal statutes, discussed below, the Hatch-Waxman Act (1984) 
and the Biosimilars Act (2009), attempt to navigate the narrow path between 
protecting commercial incentives to innovate and expanding American consum-
ers’ access to life-saving medical products, with different degrees of success. 
Broadly speaking, the process by which prescription drugs arrive on the mar-
ket in the United States under these two statutes is as follows. First, a drug inno-
vator spends billions of dollars developing and testing a brand new medica-
tion.114 Second, the innovator obtains approval to market the drug from the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)115 and files a patent application with the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in which it must disclose the molecular 
structure of the substance and how to manufacture it.116 Third, the innovator 
enjoys twenty years117 of protection from competition under the patent and may 
charge for the product whatever amount the market will bear.118 Finally, once 
the patent expires, different drug manufacturers can begin to produce follow-on 
versions of the drug119 and obtain abbreviated approval from the FDA for the 
follow-on product.120 The follow-on product often enters the market at a price 
tremendously lower than that of the reference product.121 The next sections de-
scribe the mechanics of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Biosimilars Act in more 
detail. 
 
 
 
 
 112 Hannah Brennan et. al., supra note 110, at 285-86. 
 113 See generally id. (discussing the case of sofosbuvir, a medication first marketed in 2013 to 
cure hepatitis C at a staggering cost of $100,000.) 
 114 Michael Enzo Furrow, Pharmaceutical Patent Life-Cycle Management After KSR v. Teleflex, 
63 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 275, 283 (2008). 
 115 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: ABOUT FDA PRODUCT APPROVAL, 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/approvals-fda-regulated-products/about-fda-product-
approval (last visited Oct. 5, 2019). 
 116 KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 8-9 (2019). 
 117 In certain circumstances, the PTO may grant an additional five years of patent protection 
to account for delays in FDA approval. Id. at 10. 
 118 Hannah Brennan et. al., supra note 110, at 284. 
 119 The term “follow-on” encompasses both generic products (exact copies of chemical 
medications, discussed fully in section IV(B)(1), infra) and biosimilar products (approximations 
of biologic medications, discussed fully in section IV(B)(2), infra). 
 120 KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 20 (2019). 
 121 Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1027. 
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1. The Hatch-Waxman Act (1984) 
 The first piece of federal legislation that provided an abbreviated pathway to 
approval for follow-on drugs was the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984.122 The Act is commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act in honor of its co-authors, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Representative 
Henry Waxman (D-CA).123 The Hatch-Waxman Act made a series of amend-
ments to the FFDCA, meaning that its provisions only apply to chemical medi-
cations and the handful of biologics, including insulin, that the FFDCA regu-
lates.124 
The Hatch-Waxman Act created two different abbreviated pathways to FDA 
approval for follow-on products.125 The purpose of these two options is to re-
move costly barriers to FDA approval for new manufacturers of previously ap-
proved products, thereby increasing competition and lowering prices.126 The first 
option is the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).127 In an ANDA, the 
maker of the generic drug must show proof that the generic is a bioequivalent of 
(i.e., has a chemical structure identical to) the name-brand drug, or reference 
product.128 FDA approval for the reference product required extensive clinical 
trial data proving the drug’s efficacy, safety, and purity.129 The pathway to FDA 
approval under an ANDA is abbreviated in that the maker of the generic need 
not repeat the clinical trials but instead may rely on the data for the reference 
product because the two substances are chemically identical.130 This saves the 
generic drug maker considerable time and money, thus facilitating the greatly 
reduced price.131 
The second option is known as the “505(b)(2)” pathway. Section 505(b)(2) 
of the Act “applies only to those variations from approved drugs that cannot be 
brought under an ANDA.”132 A 505(b)(2) applicant does not need to show bio-
equivalence to the reference product, and may rely on clinical trial data produced 
 
 122 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR 
THE 116TH CONGRESS 20 (2019). 
 123 Erik Neumann, Sen. Orrin Hatch’s influence of US healthcare, ABC NEWS (Jan. 2, 2019) 
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/sen-orrin-hatchs-influence-us-health-
care/story?id=60120082. 
 124 Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 170. 
 125 JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44643, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A 
PRIMER 6 (2016). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Pub. L. No. 98-417 (j)(2)(A)(III)(iv). 
 129 KEVIN J. HICKEY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45666, DRUG PRICING AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 20 (2019). 
 130 Id. at 20-21. 
 131 JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44643, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A 
PRIMER 6 (2016). 
 132 Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 198. 
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by a third party (such as the maker of the reference product).133 What section 
505(b)(2) amounts to is an abbreviated approval method for the very small num-
ber of biologics that fall within the scope of the FFDCA.134 
The FDA has approved a handful of follow-on biologic drugs under section 
505(b)(2), perhaps the most contentious of which was its approval of a human 
growth hormone called Omnitrope, which is used primarily for enhancement of 
fertility in women, in 2006.135 Sandoz, the manufacturer of Omnitrope, claimed 
in its application for approval that Omnitrope was “indistinguishable” from the 
reference product, Genotropin.136 The FDA, however, initially refused to review 
Sandoz’s application for abbreviated approval for Omnitrope, citing uncertainty 
as to whether Omnitrope could be shown to be sufficiently similar to Genotro-
pin as required under section 505(b)(2).137  The U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held that FDA had a duty to review Sandoz’s application for 
approval within the statutory 180-day period, thereby affirming that biologics 
could theoretically qualify for approval under section 505(b)(2).138 The FDA in-
dicated later that the FFDCA did not create an abbreviated pathway for the bio-
logics outside of its scope, and that Congress would need to act in order for one 
to exist.139 
The FDA has approved just one follow-on insulin product under Hatch-
Waxman.140 In 2015, Eli Lilly received FDA approval to market Basaglar, a fol-
low-on insulin that references Lantus, a drug manufactured by Sanofi.141 For rea-
sons that will be discussed in greater detail in section IV(C), infra, Basaglar has 
had very little impact, if any, on pricing in the insulin market.142 
Hatch-Waxman has been extraordinarily successful in increasing competition 
in the market for chemical medications and lowering prices while preserving 
 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. This interpretation of 505(b)(2)’s grant of authority has not been free of controversy. 
The FFDCA does not specifically include or exclude biologics in its broad definition of “drug” 
(see supra note 98), but the FDA quickly realized that the differences between chemical medi-
cations and biologics created confusion and uncertainty as to what path to approval these 
follow-on products should take. Id. at 196-97. 
 135 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS: 
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 7 (2019). 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Sandoz, Inc. v. Leavitt, 427 F. Supp. 2d 29, 38 (2006) (rejecting the FDA’s argument that 
the 180-day period was aspirational rather than mandatory). 
 139 Anna Wilde Mathews & Jeanne Whalen, FDA Clears Copycat Version of Human Growth 
Hormone, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114904669181067236. 
 140 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE 
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 2 (2018). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
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incentives for drug companies to innovate new products.143 That said, most bio-
logics are outside the scope of Hatch-Waxman because they are regulated under 
the PHSA, rather than the FFDCA.144 The following section addresses legisla-
tion tailored to address this much larger group of products. 
 
2. The Biosimilars Act (2009) 
Congress passed the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 
2009,145 commonly known as the Biosimilars Act, as part of the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (also known as “The Affordable Care Act,” 
President Obama’s signature legislative achievement, addressing a host of issues, 
including health insurance, health care delivery, and public health in the U.S.).146 
Many parts of the Affordable Care Act, including the Biosimilars Act, are amend-
ments to the PHSA.147 Thus, the Biosimilars Act applies to the biologics that are 
within the scope of the PHSA.148 
The Biosimilars Act mirrors Hatch-Waxman in that it provides an abbrevi-
ated pathway to FDA approval (referred to in the statute as “licensing”) for post-
patent forms of biologics.149 Because of their much more complex molecular 
structure, biologic drug makers need not show that their product is a generic, or 
identical to the reference product on a molecular level.150 They must only show 
that their product is either (1) biosimilar to the reference product, or (2) inter-
changeable with the reference product.151 These critical terms are defined in the 
statute, as discussed below. 
A product is biosimilar to the reference product if it meets five criteria.152 
First, it must be shown to be sufficiently similar through analytical studies, animal 
studies, and clinical trials.153 Second, it must use the same mechanism(s) of action 
for the condition(s) of use.154 Third, it must be intended to be prescribed for the 
 
 143 Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act, the 
2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 417, 417-18 (2011). 
 144 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS: 
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 8-9 (2019). 
 145 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2018). 
 146 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 147 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS: 
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 8 (2019). 
 148 See Id. 
 149 JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44643, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A 
PRIMER 12 (2016). The Biosimilars Act also “established regulatory exclusivities that are avail-
able to brand-name and follow-on firms…[and] stipulate[d] intricate procedures for identify-
ing and resolving patent disputes with respect to follow-on biologics.” Id. 
 150 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(2018). 
 151 Id. 
 152 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i) (2018). 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
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same condition(s) as the reference product.155 Fourth, the method of administra-
tion, dosage, and potency must be the same as those of the reference product.156 
Fifth, the manufacturing facility must meet the relevant standards to assure 
safety, purity, and potency.157 
A product is interchangeable with a reference product if meets three crite-
ria.158 First, it must be biosimilar to the reference product.159 Second, it must 
produce the same clinical results as the reference product.160 Third, the risk of 
alternating between the reference product and the interchangeable product must 
not place the patient at additional risk.161 
Because insulin falls within the regulatory scope of the FFDCA, it was never 
eligible for the abbreviated approval pathway provided for in the Biosimilars Act, 
which only applies to products regulated under the PHSA.162 The limited use of 
the 505(b)(2) option under the Hatch-Waxman Act has been available, but an 
important provision of the Biosimilars Act only recently made this distinction 
moot for purposes of expedited FDA approval.163 The Biosimilars Act, enacted 
on March 23, 2010, provides that no later than ten years from the date of enact-
ment, all applications for approvals of biologics submitted under Hatch-Waxman 
will transition into applications for biosimilar licenses under the Biosimilars 
Act.164 
What this means for insulin is that any applications for FDA approval of a 
follow-on product must meet the biosimilarity or interchangeability standards 
discussed above. FDA guidance on the transition indicates that any name-brand 
insulins previously approved have transitioned into licenses under the Biosimi-
lars Act165 and that sponsors of applications for follow-on insulin (and other 
biologics currently approved under Hatch-Waxman) must  resubmit any appli-
cations currently pending under Hatch-Waxman.166 For the purposes of this 
 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(4) (2018). 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE 
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 1-2 (2018). 
 163 AGATA DABROWSKA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44620, BIOLOGICS AND BIOSIMILARS: 
BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 8-9 (2019). 
 164 Id. 
 165 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INTERPRETATION OF THE “DEEMED TO BE A LICENSE” 
PROVISION OF THE BIOLOGICS PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2009: 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2018). 
 166 Chad A. Landmon & Christopher M. Gallo, Ph.D., Fixing the Follow-On Insulin Regulatory 
Approval “Dead Zone,” BIOSIMILAR DEVELOPMENT (Sept. 2, 2019), https://www.biosimilarde-
velopment.com/doc/fixing-the-follow-on-insulin-regulatory-approval-dead-zone-0001. 
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Note, suffice it to say that the bifurcated pathways to approval are joined as of 
March 23, 2020. 
Given the incentives for makers of follow-on products, the obvious question 
is why, after nearly a century of progress and an extraordinary degree of demand, 
there is still only one follow-on insulin. To answer this question, the following 
section explores the shortcomings of the abbreviated approval mechanisms pro-
vided for in the Hatch-Waxman and Biosimilars Acts with regard to biologic 
drugs. 
C. THE PROBLEM WITH ABBREVIATED APPROVAL AND TRADE SECRECY 
Hatch-Waxman’s abbreviated approval pathway mechanism has been highly 
successful in lowering prices for chemical medications.167 However, in spite of 
the fact that insulin has been eligible for abbreviated approval via the 505(b)(2) 
option since 1984,168 only one follow-on insulin product, Basaglar, is currently 
on the market,169 and insulin prices continue to rise.170 As of March 23, 2020, the 
transition to licenses means that insulin will continue to be eligible for abbrevi-
ated approval, now under the Biosimilars Act. The Biosimilars Act attempted to 
recreate the success of Hatch-Waxman and facilitate more competition in the 
biologics market.171 However, this goal has not been realized because abbrevi-
ated approval mechanisms do not account for the ways in which biologics are 
different from chemical medications.172 
As mentioned, biologics are comprised of much larger and more complex 
molecules than chemical medications.173 In fact, it is the case that the exact mo-
lecular structure of some biologics has never been precisely described because 
the analytical technology required to do so does not yet exist.174 This is one of 
the most salient differences between biologics and chemical medications from a 
regulatory perspective. Once a generic drug maker knows the molecular structure 
of a chemical medication, the substance can be reverse-engineered and synthe-
sized in many different ways, all arriving at the same result.175 This is not the case 
with biologics. Without specific information about how the reference product 
was manufactured, it is very difficult to say with certainty how similar the follow-
 
 167 Kelly, supra note 143, at 417-18. 
 168 See Dudzinski, supra note 39, at 191. 
 169 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE 
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 2 (2018). 
 170 Julia Belluz, The absurdly high cost of insulin, explained, VOX (May 24, 2019), 
https://www.vox.com/2019/4/3/18293950/why-is-insulin-so-expensive#. 
 171 Kelly, supra note 143, at 417. 
 172 Ryan Timmis, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Potential Problems in the Bio-
logic-Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 226 (2015). 
 173 Price & Rai, supra note 8, at 1026. 
 174 Id. at 1036. 
 175 Id. at 1034. 
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on product is to the reference product.176 As discussed in section III(C), makers 
of biologics like insulin often use patents to protect their products and trade 
secrecy to protect their manufacturing processes. Since trade secret protection 
can theoretically last forever, the provision of an abbreviated path to approval is 
of very little use because makers of follow-on products will not be able to 
demonstrate that their products are biosimilar to the name brand products. 
Now that the transition to licensed products under the Biosimilars Act is ef-
fective, any follow-on insulins must meet the requirements of biosimilarity or 
interchangeability as described above.177 This is a higher standard than what 
Hatch-Waxman formerly required of follow-on biologics under 505(b)(2), mean-
ing that the barrier to entry for follow-on insulins that could help lower prices 
just got higher.178 Given the sluggishness of the follow-on insulin market until 
now (only one follow-on product for a drug that has been available for decades), 
179 the transition seems likely to stall the market even further. The final part of 
this Note argues that a reduction of trade secret protection for manufacturing 
processes is needed to address the urgent public health problem that insulin pric-
ing poses. 
V. FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE INSULIN PRICING PROBLEM 
The discussion above paints a grim picture. The abbreviated pathway to ap-
proval provided for under federal law has not achieved its goal of increasing 
competition and lowering prices in the insulin market. As progress stalls, many 
people with diabetes continue to struggle to pay for the medication they need as 
insulin prices continue to rise. 
It should be noted that some steps have been taken in 2019 by both corpo-
rations and governments to alleviate the insulin pricing crisis. For example, the 
three major insulin manufacturers, Eli Lilly, Sanofi, and Novo Nordisk, have 
each announced that they will lower the list prices of their insulin products.180 
Furthermore, pharmacy benefits manager, Express Scripts, announced a price 
cap of twenty-five dollars per month for its members.181 Colorado recently 
passed legislation capping the price of insulin at $100 per month for insured pa-
tients.182 
 
 176 Id. 
 177 John White & Jennifer Goldman, Biosimilar and Follow-On Insulin: The Ins, Outs, and Inter-
changeability, 35:1 J. PHARMACY TECH. 25, 28 (2019). 
 178 Id. 
 179 JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11026, INSULIN PRODUCTS AND THE 
COST OF DIABETES TREATMENT 2 (2018). 
 180 Jacobsen, supra note 7. 
 181 Alison Kodjak, Express Scripts Takes Steps to Cut Insulin’s Price to Patients, NPR NEWS (Apr. 
3, 2019) https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/04/03/709212404/express-
scripts-takes-steps-to-cut-insulins-price-to-patients 1/. 
 182 Belluz, supra note 170. 
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These efforts have one thing in common: they illustrate the fact that attention 
is increasingly being directed at this issue. The increase in attention, however, 
does not mean that the issue is solved. Unfortunately, all of the measures identi-
fied above are too limited in scope to serve as a complete solution to the prob-
lem. After all, Novo Nordisk or Express Scripts, for example, may decide tomor-
row that the price guarantees they make today are no longer economically viable, 
which will leave diabetic patients in much the same place they are now. Many 
diabetics with health insurance in Colorado are seemingly out of immediate dan-
ger, but Colorado is home to only a very small percentage of all diabetics in the 
U.S.183 This is why legislation at the federal level is necessary to correct this issue 
for good. 
As discussed in section III(C) infra, trade secret is one of the three forms of 
intellectual property protection available to pharmaceutical innovators. In order 
for an innovation to qualify for this protection, it must: (1) confer economic 
benefit upon the holder, (2) not be generally known, and (3) be the object of 
reasonable steps by the holder to maintain its secrecy.184 
Makers of pharmaceutical products, and biologic drugs in particular, avail 
themselves of trade secret protection quite liberally.185 Trade secret is particularly 
attractive for protecting the manufacturing processes for insulin and other bio-
logics, which has a major impact on competition.186 Biologics like insulin differ 
considerably from chemical medications in terms of the difficulty of manufac-
turing them.187 Small-molecule chemical medications are relatively simple to de-
scribe scientifically,188 and a generic manufacturer can use any of a number of 
methods to synthesize the compound, all of which produce a result easily proven 
to be identical to the reference product.189 
Insulin and other biologics, by contrast, have much more complex chemical 
structures.190 Small differences in the method of synthesis can lead to broad var-
iation in the final result.191 This means that showing biosimilarity is very difficult 
unless the manufacturer uses the same method that the maker of the reference 
product used.192 Furthermore, the precise molecular identity of some biologic 
drugs is not known because the analytical techniques needed to make that deter-
mination do not yet exist.193 
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 192 Id. at 1036. 
 193 Id. at 1028. 
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Crucially, to qualify for abbreviated approval under the Biosimilars Act, the 
maker of the biosimilar must make a product that not only is biosimilar, but can 
be shown to be biosimilar.194 Because trade secret protection can theoretically 
last indefinitely,195 makers of would-be biosimilar insulins may never have access 
to manufacturing process information, all but foreclosing the possibility of pro-
ducing a follow-on insulin that the maker is able to prove is biosimilar to the 
reference.196 A claim that X is the same as Y is impossible to prove or disprove 
when Y’s identity is not known. 
A scaling back of trade secret protection for pharmaceuticals would amelio-
rate this problem. The Biosimilars Act does not require the maker of a reference 
product to disclose manufacturing information to any greater extent than is re-
quired under Hatch-Waxman, which means that it is unlikely to be successful in 
increasing competition in the insulin market now that insulin is within its 
scope.197 Insulin will likely continue to be more trouble than it is worth to bio-
similar manufacturers. 
The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 provides an extremely broad scope of 
the type of information that may be eligible for trade secret protection:  
[A]ll forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, 
economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, 
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, 
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, 
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, com-
piled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, pho-
tographically, or in writing.198 
The breadth of the protection available under the DTSA means that makers of 
follow-on insulins will have an extremely difficult time showing that their prod-
ucts are biosimilar. 
Statutorily eliminating biologics manufacturing process information from 
trade secret eligibility (as an amendment to the Biosimilars Act, for example) 
would force pharmaceutical companies to choose among three alternatives. They 
could: (a) include process information in their patent application, (b) apply for 
separate patent protection for the process and the product, or (c) leave the pro-
cess information with no protection at all. Acknowledging choice (c) to be in all 
likelihood the least popular of these, the net effect would be that the process by 
which biologics like insulin are manufactured would become part of the public 
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domain once the patent expires, rather than remaining secret indefinitely as it 
does today. 
This change would naturally have downstream effects, both positive and neg-
ative. The first advantage would be that insulin and other biologics would be-
come more attractive to makers of follow-on products. Armed with the 
knowledge needed to create a biosimilar without going through the costly pro-
cess of additional research and development, follow-on firms could produce bi-
osimilar insulins more cheaply. 
The second advantage would be that the growing fund of public knowledge 
about insulin and other biologics would facilitate greater innovation in the field 
over time.199 By keeping critical information about their discoveries secret, phar-
maceutical companies prevent other companies, universities, and private re-
search firms from benefitting from it.200 Trade secret law is often criticized for 
its tendency to cause redundancy and duplication of effort,201 and repetition of 
clinical trials to prove that a follow-on is biosimilar or interchangeable can cost 
hundreds of millions of dollars.202 A free flow of information about process in a 
field where process has a tremendous influence on the identity and quality of the 
final product203 would have substantial value to society.204 
To that end, the third advantage to reducing trade secret protections would 
be a rebalancing of the public and private interests at stake in the market for 
insulin. The free-market approach to drugs and other medical products that op-
erates in the U.S. presumes that the same forces at work in the markets for Coca-
Cola and iPhones are at work in similar ways in the markets for insulin and other 
healthcare products.205 As discussed previously, the free-market approach has 
undoubted advantages,206 but the ethical implications of letting the market decide 
who can afford insulin and who cannot should not be ignored. A reduction of 
protection for an already immensely profitable industry207 would ease the burden 
on people who rely on insulin for survival. 
On the other hand, this approach does have drawbacks. For example, as with 
any limitation on intellectual property protection, there is the concern that this 
would decrease incentives to innovate.208 Insulin makers may decide to slow or 
halt development of costly new products if they fear that they will not be able to 
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recoup their losses.209 However, this particular issue seems to be of less concern 
here than in other situations in which cutting edge biologics are not yet on the 
market. Insulin’s age and long history in the market will likely shield it from this 
negative effect because several safe and effective varieties already exist. Thus, 
while reducing trade secret protections for biologics may have the effect of mak-
ing some drug manufacturers more reluctant to develop entirely new biologic 
drugs, it will likely have the opposite effect of improving competition for drugs 
that are already on the market. Furthermore, a compromise might be made to 
restrict the scaling-back of trade secret protection to insulin alone, rather than to 
all biologics. Using insulin as a sort of pilot for a broader scheme of reducing 
trade secret protections in the pharmaceutical industry would provide lawmakers 
and the public with some context for the effectiveness of such a scheme. 
A second potential drawback to this proposal is the possibility of a chilling 
effect on insulin production in general. Once information about manufacturing 
insulin enters the public domain, regulatory agencies like FDA will have the abil-
ity to set manufacturing standards accordingly.210 The more that is known about 
a substance, the easier it is to regulate.211 An increase in the minimum standard 
may raise production costs, thus deterring current producers from continuing to 
make insulin, and discouraging new firms from entering the insulin market in the 
first place. 
Trade secrecy has kept the barriers to entry high for competitors in the insulin 
market.212 There is no question that, in general, insulin and other biologics are 
more difficult and more expensive to produce than chemical medications.213 
Thus, the U.S. is unlikely to see drastic price reductions for these products such 
as those that resulted from the enactment of Hatch-Waxman.214 However, the 
current situation is clearly untenable for patients, and a scaling back of trade se-
crecy in the insulin market would likely help facilitate price reduction. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, a relaxation of trade secret protection for 
insulin is the intellectual property policy that is most likely to improve the current 
state of the insulin market from the patient’s perspective. With a decrease in trade 
secret protection, pharmaceutical companies will be forced to patent their man-
ufacturing processes, thus ameliorating the problem of under-disclosure.215 The 
patent system’s balancing of individual and public interest will lower the barriers 
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to entry for follow-on firms once patents expire,216 and the expansion of the 
public fund of knowledge will facilitate further innovation in the future.217 
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